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ABSTRACT 
In a context of intense airport and airline competition, a few European airports have recently started offering self-
connection services to price-sensitive holiday passengers travelling with a combination of tickets where the 
airline/s involved do not handle the transfer themselves. This paper provides an exploratory analysis of the 
potential and implications of self-connectivity for European airports and airlines using a case study of air travel 
routes to holiday destinations in the Mediterranean. With the help of a forecasting model based on a zero-inflated 
Poisson regression, we identify the airports and airlines that have the highest potential to facilitate self-connections 
in the selected markets. The results also explore some implications of the widespread development of self-
connection services in Europe. 
Keywords: Tourist airports; self-connectivity; holiday travel; Poisson regression. 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, many low-cost carriers (LCCs) have reacted to the strong competitive 
environment by adopting strategies traditionally associated to full-service network carriers, 
such as price bundling, codesharing agreements, and operating connecting flights (Klophaus et 
al., 2012; Lieshout et al., 2015; Morandi et al., 2015; Fageda et al., 2015). This reveals an 
interest by low-cost operators to tap into a market they have been neglecting: self-connecting 
passengers that build their own itineraries by combining multiple tickets and taking care of 
their own baggage transfer. Recently, a few airports have shown that they wish to cater to the 
needs of self-connecting passengers as well. For example, London Gatwick and Milano 
Malpensa started offering self-connection services to passengers travelling with a combination 
of tickets where the airline/s involved do not handle the transfer themselves (ViaMilano, 2016). 
In exchange for a fee, self-connecting passengers at Gatwick are offered a baggage transfer 
service as well as insurance against the risk of missing their onward flight in the event of delays 
(Gatwick Airport, 2015). Another feature of these self-connectivity platforms is a dedicated 
booking system that presents self-connecting tickets to the passengers automatically. This 
improves the “visibility” of these travel options since passengers do not have to put an extra 
search effort to build their own tickets, as they have to do in booking systems that only show 
traditional flight connections. Airlines must sign up to participate in self-connecting schemes 
at each airport and they may do so if the interline connectivity creates economies of traffic 
density (Starkie, 2007). Airports, on the other hand, can also benefit from increased non-
aeronautical revenues linked to the extra connecting passengers (Malighetti et al., 2008).  
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One of the key targets of self-connection services are price-sensitive holiday passengers1. This 
is evident from the marketing materials of Gatwick and Milano airports, which point at 
potential cost savings in self-connection itineraries to/from destinations in the Mediterranean. 
Assuming that leisure passengers are willing to accept travel detours to save in airfares (Fageda 
et al., 2015; OAG, 2016), and taking into account that intra-European routes are dominated by 
point-to-point LCC services (Dobruszkes, 2013) with limited traditional connectivity, we 
hypothesize that there is potential for a more widespread development of self-connection 
platforms at European airports that cater to passengers in holiday markets.  
In this context, we aim to evaluate several aspects of this business opportunity that have not 
yet received substantial attention in the literature. We focus on 1) identifying the airports and 
airlines that have the highest potential for self-connectivity, and 2) discuss the barriers and 
facilitating factors for airports and airlines to support self-connectivity. To that end, we use 
Market Information Data Tapes (MIDT) for June 2014 that cover routes from Europe to holiday 
destinations in the Mediterranean. A Quality of Service Index (QSI) methodology, based on 
coefficients obtained using a zero-inflated Poisson regression, is employed to predict the 
amount of potential traffic that could be captured by self-connecting travel alternatives 
identified with a connections builder (CB) algorithm. 
Table 1. Examples of self-connecting routes marketed by European airports 
GatwickConnects  ViaMilano 
Origin Destination Regular Connection 
Cheapest price (travel time) 
Self-Connection  
Cheapest price (travel time) 
 Origin Destination Price 
New York  Larnaca £957 (18 h) £203 (14 h 5 m)  Barcelona Rome €131 
Agadir Helsinki £378 (21 h 50 m) £152 (9 h 55 m)  Budapest Rome €128 
Inverness Palma £225 (22 h) £108 (7 h)  Budapest Alghero €130 
Madrid Reykjavik £237 (9h 10 m) £144 (8h)  Budapest Cagliari €139 
Source: Gatwick Airport (September 2015), www.flyviamilano.edu (April 2016) 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and states our 
contribution. Section 3 introduces the case study, datasets, and methodology. Section 4 presents 
the results and discusses their main implications. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our findings, 
addresses the limitations of our model, and proposes new paths for future research. 
2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
While there have been many papers analyzing the connectivity of airline networks (e.g. 
Veldhuis, 1997; Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005), the phenomenon of self-connectivity was firstly 
defined by Burghouwt (2007) as “self-help hubbing”, while Malighetti et al., (2008) were the 
first to analyse it in detail. Using data on airline schedules, they concluded that there were many 
attractive indirect travel options2 involving self-connections. In particular, they found that two-
thirds of the fastest indirect connections within Europe were provided outside the scope of the 
individual airline alliances. In terms of methodology, we aim to complement their analysis of 
airline schedules with demand data on actual passenger itineraries (MIDT). This is a novel 
contribution to the literature on self-connectivity in airline networks. It is a relevant 
improvement since not all self-connecting travel alternatives will be equally important for the 
airport and airlines involved. Their importance will depend on factors that can only be 
measured with demand data: 1) the size of the relevant origin and destination market, i.e. how 
many passengers do actually want to travel between the two places? 2) how competitive are 
the other available travel options that passengers have actually taken within the same market?  
                                                 
1 Indeed, tourism demand is influenced by the cost of travel (Garin-Munoz et al., 2006; Ben-David et al., 2016). 
2 In this paper, we refer to a travel alternative, travel option or travel itinerary as a sequence of flights between the 
passenger’s point of origin and ultimate destination. Most origin and destination markets can be served by multiple 
travel alternatives, which can be either direct (non-stop) or indirect (involving at least one flight connection). 
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Connection builders (CB) are typically employed to identify the competitive travel alternatives 
in air transport markets (Halpern and Graham, 2013). Using data on airline schedules, these 
algorithms search for all valid flight connections between predefined origin and destination 
airports. Then, there is need to forecast the demand that each travel itinerary can capture. In 
that regard, Halpern and Graham (2013) notes that Quality of Service Index (QSI) models have 
been adopted as industry standard and are widely applied by airports to forecast market shares 
of new routes. QSI models assign a weighted “score” to each travel alternative based on a set 
of predictors of passenger choice. The most common demand predictors include fares, 
frequencies, connecting times, number of stops, travel detours, aircraft type, or departure time3 
(Tembleque-Villalta and Suau-Sanchez, 2015; Narangajavan et al., 2014). Our paper is the first 
to add self-connectivity to that list of demand predictors. A common criticism of QSI models 
is that the weights of each predictor usually take arbitrary values (Wei and Hansen, 2006). In 
order to overcome that limitation, we calibrate the predictor weights using a regression method 
on the observed passenger behaviour recorded in the MIDT data. In accordance with the 
observed distributional characteristics of passenger bookings, we model it as count data and 
employ a Poisson model (Mao et al., 2015).  
In summary, we advance the literature about self-connectivity in airline networks with the use 
of MIDT demand data that leads to a more precise determination of the amount and value of 
the self-connections available at European airports. To that end, we employ methods that are 
well established in the context of airport route development (QSI and CB), thus helping the 
implementation of our methods by practitioners in the air transport industry.  
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Case study and datasets 
We focus on the air transport routes that originate in the European Economic Area and 
terminate in a coastal destination in (or around) the Mediterranean region during the first week 
of June 2014. Data was available from these countries: Morocco, Algeria, Malta, Egypt, Jordan, 
Israel, Lebanon, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Croatia, Italy, France, Monaco, Spain, Gibraltar, and 
Portugal. All island destinations in these countries are included, even the Atlantic ones 
(Canaries, Madeira, and Azores). For mainland Spain, France, and Italy, only the airports 
serving Mediterranean destinations are designed as such (See Appendix A for more details). 
Our MIDT dataset includes 3.2 million passenger bookings obtained from the OAG Traffic 
Analyser. The original sources of information for the MIDT dataset are Global Distributions 
Systems (GDSs), such as Galileo, Sabre, or Amadeus. Table 2 provides a breakdown of 
bookings per origin and destination countries. As expected, countries like UK, Italy, and 
Germany are among the largest generators. Spain, Italy, and Greece are the top traffic attractors 
on the European side, while Morocco is the top destination on the African side. It is worth 
highlighting Italy’s dual role as origin and destination country, which is related to its unique 
geography with a large number of Mediterranean airports, including Rome, while also leaving 
major airports in the North (e.g. Milan), outside of the pool of destinations. 
Table 2. Distribution of MIDT passenger bookings per origin and destination country (1st week June 2014) 
Origin Country bookings   Origin Country (cont.) bookings   Destination country bookings 
UK 610,964  Poland 26,593  Spain 1,182,721 
Italy 509,613  Romania 23,528  Italy 766,121 
Germany 417,678  Finland 19,027  Greece 353,872 
Spain 408,459  Cyprus 15,577  Portugal 263,274 
France 368,574  Hungary 13,743  France 223,846 
                                                 
3 Travel purpose is also a common predictor. However, due to the selection of routes in our case study (leisure 
destinations), the distinction between business and leisure is less relevant. Furthermore, recent evidence from 
Bilotkach et al., (2015) challenges the view that LCC leisure passengers are significantly more price elastic. 
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Greece 144,927  Croatia 11,353  Morocco 102,550 
Belgium 106,454  Luxembourg 8,543  Israel 72,744 
Switzerland 96,075  Malta 7,584  Croatia 64,669 
Netherlands 95,289  Lithuania 6,704  Algeria 49,408 
Portugal 63,361  Bulgaria 6,208  Cyprus 42,342 
Ireland 55,384  Slovakia 2,837  Egypt 39,014 
Norway 50,497  Latvia 2,536  Malta 38,671 
Sweden 46,781  Estonia 2,337  Lebanon 14,733 
Denmark 38,388  Iceland 2,304  Jordan 8,636 
Austria 34,816  Monaco 644  Gibraltar 3,627 
Czech Republic 27,487   Slovenia 566   Monaco 848 
Source: MIDT 
It is also possible to disaggregate the bookings according to the type of itinerary (Table 3). The 
vast majority of bookings (91.7%) are for non-stop travel. In spite of that, the amount of 
connecting passengers is not negligible (266 thousand per week) and represents an attractive 
segment of demand that airports could develop by facilitating self-connections.    
Table 3. Distribution of MIDT passengers in the sample market per type of itinerary (1st week June 2014) 
Itinerary Bookings % 
Non-stop 2,959,429 91.7% 
1-stop 250,940 7.8% 
2-stops 16,707 0.5% 
Total 3,227,076   
Source: MIDT 
Table 4 shows the top ten intermediate hubs in the sample. Rome Fiumicino (FCO) has a dual 
role as a major traffic generator and Europe’s busiest gateway to onward Mediterranean 
destinations. However, airports located outside the Mediterranean countries, such as Frankfurt 
or Munich can also leverage their destination mixes to expand their participation in leisure 
markets by means of indirect connections. Table 4 also shows the top ten airlines according to 
passenger bookings. As expected, intra-European markets are dominated by LCCs such as 
Ryanair and Easyjet, which supports the hypothesis that a large number of self-connecting 
opportunities will be found among these airlines that do not typically operate transfer flights.   
Table 4. Top ten airlines and hub airports in the sample (1st week June 2014) 
Airport Code Departures Connections  Ticketing Airline Code Bookings 
Rome Fiumicino FCO 108,444 36,572  Ryanair FR 742,839 
Frankfurt FRA 71,923 25,642  Easyjet U2 359,445 
Munich MUC 66,984 18,896  Vueling VY 211,895 
Madrid Barajas MAD 105,037 18,268  Alitalia AZ 134,504 
Athens ATH 70,810 12,622  Air Berlin AB 127,995 
Barcelona BCN 86,461 11,864  Aegean Airlines A3 118,023 
Paris Charles de Gaulle CDG 80,727 10,333  Air France AF 91,849 
Zurich ZRH 37,233 9,483  TAP TP 76,474 
Istanbul Ataturk IST 9,246 9,246  Lufthansa LH 70,970 
Vienna VIE 35,231 9,048  Monarch ZB 70,963 
Source: MIDT 
We also employ two additional datasets of global flight schedules and airport-specific 
minimum connecting times (including airline-specific exceptions) valid for the first week of 
June 2014, obtained from OAG as well. 
3.2 Connection Builder 
Flight frequency is one of the key predictors of passenger choice. Therefore, we employ a CB 
method to find all valid itineraries in the selected markets. The parameters of our CB algorithm 
are summarized in Table 5. For each airport-pair in the MIDT file, a search is made in the 
schedules dataset for all valid flight combinations from the origin airport to the destination 
airport (up to a maximum of two stops). No interline restrictions are imposed. For a flight 
combination to be valid it must meet the published minimum connecting times.  
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In order to discard unrealistic flight combinations (Redondi et al., 2011; Seredyński et al., 2014; 
Grosche and Klophaus, 2015), we impose a maximum geographic detour for each market (ratio 
between indirect and non-stop flight distance) based on the real-world itineraries in the MIDT 
file. To mitigate the influence of outliers, we discard every flight combination found by the CB 
algorithm that is above the 95% percentile of the market-specific distribution of geographic 
detour calculated from the itineraries in the MIDT file. With the same objective, an additional 
constraint is imposed in regards to maximum travel time increase (ratio between total indirect 
travel time, including flight connections, and non-stop travel time). That limit is established at 
the 95% percentile in the market-specific distribution of travel time increase. This distribution 
includes all traditional flight combinations within a one-hour window with respect to the best 
weekly indirect travel time in each itinerary. The goal is to keep only the self-connecting flight 
combinations that are competitive in the sense that there is evidence that passengers are willing 
to accept these geographic detours and travel time increases in traditional flight connections4. 
Table 5. Parameters of the connection builder 
1. No interline restrictions 
2. Published minimum connecting times must be met 
3. Maximum geographic detour per origin-destination market (95% percentile of MIDT itineraries) 
4. Maximum travel time increase per origin-destination market (95% percentile of MIDT itineraries) 
4a. Based on best weekly traditional connecting time (+ 1 hour) in each individual itinerary 
A flight combination is labelled as “self-connecting” if either: 1) both arriving and departure 
airlines are LCCs (as indicated by ICAO, 2014)5, or 2) arriving and departure airlines are not 
part of the same alliance. This broad definition, however, leaves some traditional connections 
misclassified, such as those provided in virtue of out-of-alliance interlining agreements and 
also the transfer services provided by LCCs at selected locations. We identify these cases by 
cross-checking our CB flight combinations against the published minimum connecting times 
dataset, as it is common that airlines providing these connections file an exception to the 
airport’s default values. The outcome of this stage is a dataset of 469,734 unique itineraries 
that the CB identified as valid travel alternatives within the selected markets. 
3.3 Poisson regression and QSI model 
The CB itineraries are combined with the MIDT passenger bookings, returning a dataset of 
134,724 consolidated itineraries, 78.24% of which (105,402) did not have any bookings. Our 
dependent variable is the number of weekly passenger bookings per itinerary (See Table 6). 
Since bookings only take non-negative integer values, they can be defined as count data (Mao 
et al., 2015). Poisson regressions are typically used to model count data. However, these models 
are restrictive in the sense that the Poisson distribution assumes that the conditional mean is 
equal to the conditional variance. This assumption is not met by our data, which shows clear 
signs of overdispersion. 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of dependent variable 
variable n mean variance Zero obs p1 p75 p90 p95 p99 max 
bookings 134,724 23.27 32,932.26 105,402 0 0 7 30 636 12,936 
 
One way to deal with the high variance is to account for the excessive amount of zero-booking 
travel itineraries. To that end, we employ a zero-inflated Poisson regression in order to separate 
between “true zeros” and “excess zeros” (Greene, 1994). This method models two separate 
                                                 
4 For example, assume that the MIDT indicates that the market from airport A to airport B has 100 passengers, 50 
travelling non-stop, 48 indirect via C (geographic detour = 1.2 and travel time increase = 1.4), and 2 travelling 
indirect via D (geographic detour = 1.5 and travel time increase = 2). Self-connecting travel options for this market 
will be restricted to a geographic detour of 1.2 and travel time increase of 1.4. If the number of passengers on the 
“D” itinerary was higher of equal than five, the cut-off values would have been 1.5 and 2, respectively. 
5 This applies to either flight connection in the case of 2-stop itineraries. 
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data generation processes for each observation, one that generates zero counts and another 
generating Poisson counts. For travel itinerary i (Yi), the zero-generating process is chosen with 
probability φi and the Poisson process with probability (1- φi): 
(1) 𝜇𝑖 = exp⁡(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) 
(2) 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 0|𝑥𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖) = 𝜑𝑖(𝑧𝑖′𝛾) + (1 − 𝜑𝑖(𝑧𝑖′𝛾))exp⁡(−𝜇𝑖) 
(3) 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖) = (1 − 𝜑𝑖(𝑧𝑖′𝛾))
𝜇𝑖
𝑦𝑖exp⁡(−𝜇𝑖)
𝑦𝑖!
 
The φi probability is modelled against the characteristics of each observation (zi) using a logistic 
function with parameters γ to be estimated. The Poisson process has mean 𝜇𝑖 that is regressed 
against the characteristics of each observation (xi) using a log-linear specification with 
parameters β to be estimated. The mean and variance of the zero-inflated Poisson model are 
given by: 
(4) 𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) = 𝜇𝑖(1 − 𝜑𝑖)  
(5) 𝑉(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) = 𝜇𝑖(1 − 𝜑𝑖)(1 + 𝜇𝑖𝜑𝑖) 
In order to estimate the model, there is need to define the x and z variables. In accordance with 
the previous literature, the following predictors of passenger choice are included: 
1) Weekly frequencies per itinerary: count data can be treated as the product of an incidence 
rate (in our case, bookings per individual frequency within each itinerary) and an exposure 
(frequencies per itinerary). Thus, we define weekly frequencies as exposure variable, with its 
coefficient restricted to 1. The interpretation of the remaining coefficients is thus made in terms 
of incidence rate.  
2) Seat capacity at market and itinerary level: we separate between non-stop, 1-stop, and 2-stop 
seats. An indicator of concentration of seat capacity across airlines (the Hirschmann-Herfindhal 
Index-HHI is calculated as the sum of the airlines’ squared capacity shares) and the share of 
the ticketing airline’s seat capacity to total market capacity are included as well in order to 
control for the effects of market dominance. 
3) Number of stops and average airfares:  Borrowing from Coldren and Koppelman (2005), we 
create a set of dummy variables that indicate whether the itinerary is non-stop, 1-stop, or 2-
stops in comparison with best available itinerary in each market. For example, we find 1-stop 
itineraries that operate in markets where non-stop connections are either available or not. This 
captures the diversity in competitive environments. In regards to prices, due to data restrictions, 
traditional itineraries are given average fares per type of connection between airport-pair 
markets (i.e. prices are not airline-specific). Self-connecting travel options are given a sum of 
the average non-stop prices for each travel segment (as if the flights were bought separately). 
We also identify the indirect itineraries that present the best average fares in each market and 
calculate the difference between an itinerary’s fare and the best in the market. 
4) Travel time increase (TTI): It is expected that itineraries with longer travel times (related to 
either geographic detour of flight transfers) are less attractive to passengers. The impact of TTI 
is differentiated according to number of stops. 
5) Connectivity: The model accounts for two aspects of airline connectivity that can have an 
impact in demand. First, the proportion of self-connecting frequencies in the consolidated 
itinerary. This variable is interpreted as an impedance to informed passengers, i.e. a bad 
“quality” effect associated to the baggage transfer and risk of missing the onward flight. These 
passengers may or may not self-connect depending on the other aspects of the itinerary. 
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Second, inter-terminal connectivity labels those itineraries where a transfer between different 
terminals is required at any time during the trip. 
6) Other: The Poisson model is completed with other common predictors of passenger choice, 
such as aircraft size (calculated as seats per frequency), market length (great circle distance 
from origin to destination), and departure time (morning: 6am-12pm; afternoon: 12pm-6pm; 
and evening: 6pm-12am, all times UTC). In addition, we include dummies for countries of 
origin and destination, as well as the largest hubs and airlines in order to capture any 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
7) Zero-generating process: Excess zeros represent itineraries that were not easily accessible 
to passengers because of not appearing alongside traditional flight connections in booking 
systems (they are not “visible”) and required an extra search effort. Thus, one can expect self-
connecting itineraries to be disproportionately empty of bookings as they may be actually 
unknown to the air travellers. TTI is the second variable that can explain a disproportionate 
amount of zero-bookings for travel itineraries.  
The estimation output is presented in Table 7. The equation is globally significant and the signs 
of the coefficients are similar. Marginal effects of the individual variables are provided, which 
indicate the increase in predicted bookings per itinerary associated to a unit increase in the 
relevant explanatory variable. These are evaluated are the sample means. The dummy variables 
related to number of stops have the expected signs, 2-stop itineraries tend to have less 
passengers per frequency than 1-stop itineraries and the negative impact of indirect travel is 
exacerbated by the availability of shorter itineraries in the market. In terms of marginal effects, 
a 1-stop itinerary can be expected to capture between 35 and 39 fewer weekly bookings than a 
non-stop itinerary. The marginal effect for a 2-stop itinerary is between 76 and 85 fewer weekly 
bookings. Interestingly, having the lowest fares tends to boost demand only when indirect 
travel undercuts direct travel. Travel Time Increases generally have the expected negative 
impact on the number of passengers per itinerary. However, being the fastest 2-stop itinerary 
boosts demand. Inter-terminal connections are seen as a burden by passengers (marginal effect: 
-2.08 bookings), and the same applies to self-connections in 1-stop itineraries. Involving a self- 
connection decreases demand in 21.3 weekly bookings with respect to a traditional 1-stop 
connection. Surprisingly, self-connectivity seems to boost demand for 2-stop itineraries, which 
suggests that, in an intra-European context where distances are relatively short, the few 2-stop 
itineraries taken by passengers (0.5% of total bookings – See Table 3) come as a result of 
passengers actively searching for these routes to save in airfares (or for other, unexplained 
reasons). Overall, the marginal effect for self-connections (without separating 1-stop and 2-
stop) is negative and significant (-2.9) which is consistent with our expectations. As expected, 
self-connectivity also increases the probability of an itinerary to capture zero bookings, and the 
same applies to Travel Time Increase for 2-stop itineraries.  
Table 7. Estimation output  
Dependent variable: bookings 
zero-inflated Poisson  
coeff. s.d. prob. Marginal   
Non-stop weekly seat capacity (market) -0.0000114 2.38E-07 0.000 -0.0002  
1-stop weekly seat capacity (market) -1.04E-06 1.69E-08 0.000 -2.22E-05  
2-stops weekly seat capacity (market) -1.12E-07 4.26E-08 0.009 -2.39E-06  
HHI of weekly seat capacity (market) 0.2026337 0.0055259 0.000 4.3268  
Share of seat capacity to market capacity (itinerary) -0.3395394 0.0053488 0.000 -7.2501  
Non-stop weekly seat capacity (itinerary) 0.000019 4.71E-07 0.000 0.0004  
1-stop weekly seat capacity (itinerary) -0.0000449 7.34E-07 0.000 -0.0010  
2-stops weekly seat capacity (itinerary) -0.000882 0.0000333 0.000 -0.0188  
1-stop itinerary in non-stop market -1.827484 0.0216595 0.000 -39.0218  
1-stop itinerary in non-stop market: Lowest fare 0.0328398 0.0097996 0.001 0.7012  
1-stop itinerary in non-stop market: Diff. to lowest fare -0.008993 0.0045128 0.046 -0.1920  
1-stop itinerary in 1-stop market -1.668231 0.0204645 0.000 -35.6214  
1-stop itinerary in 1-stop market: Lowest fare -0.0556045 0.00839 0.000 -1.1873  
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1-stop itinerary in 1-stop market: Diff. to lowest fare -0.0900833 0.0048127 0.000 -1.9235  
2-stops itinerary in non-stop market -4.008253 0.2709896 0.000 -85.5873  
2-stops itinerary in non-stop market: Lowest fare 0.2692836 0.1661858 0.105 5.7499  
2-stops itinerary in non-stop market: Diff. to lowest fare -0.0607061 0.0556148 0.275 -1.2962  
2-stops itinerary in 1-stop market -3.602122 0.2278661 0.000 -76.9153  
2-stops itinerary in 1-stop market: Lowest fare -0.5977984 0.0863144 0.000 -12.7647  
2-stops itinerary in 1-stop market: Diff. to lowest fare -0.2221506 0.0356289 0.000 -4.7435  
2-stops itinerary in 2-stops market -3.656345 0.2376258 0.000 -78.0731  
2-stops itinerary in 2-stops market: Lowest fare 0.3344464 0.0752663 0.000 7.1414  
2-stops itinerary in 2-stops market: Diff. to lowest fare 0.0262828 0.0366443 0.473 0.5612  
Travel Time Increase (Itinerary) -0.2616182 0.0040136 0.000 -5.6510  
1-stop itinerary: Lowest TTI -0.5932619 0.0181459 0.000 -12.6678  
1-stop itinerary: Difference to lowest TTI -0.6167698 0.0142583 0.000 -13.1697  
2-stops itinerary: Lowest TTI 0.6825578 0.2200457 0.002 14.5745  
2-stops itinerary: Difference to lowest TTI 0.5548282 0.1827161 0.002 11.8471  
Inter-terminal connection -0.097404 0.0062859 0.000 -2.0798  
1-stop itinerary: Self-Connection -0.9955423 0.0085201 0.000 -21.2576  
2-stops itinerary: Self-Connection 0.2498127 0.0580707 0.000 5.3342  
Morning Departure -0.0940203 0.0024768 0.000 -2.0076  
Afternoon Departure -0.0805105 0.0026272 0.000 -1.7191  
Evening Departure -0.0938494 0.0036608 0.000 -2.0039  
Great circle distance (market) 0.0000125 1.31E-06 0.000 0.0003  
Average aircraft size (itinerary) 0.007477 0.0000231 0.000 0.1597  
Constant 3.375696 0.0347714 0.000   
ln(total weekly frequencies per itinerary) 1 (exposure)    
+ origin/destination country effects    
+ airline effects     
+ hub effects      
Excess zeros          
1-stop itinerary: Self-Connection 3.202783 0.0267361 0.000   
2-stops itinerary: Self-Connection 2.267641 0.0683318 0.000   
1-stop itinerary: TTI 0.0680469 0.0119891 0.000   
2-stops itinerary: TTI 1.825959 0.0263364 0.000   
Constant -1.971573 0.0294371 0.000    
Overdispersion     
Alpha          
Observations: 132911 (1813 missing values) Chisq(125) 1.23E+07   
non-zero: 29319   0.000    
 
The regression coefficients are applied to the original CB itineraries in order to obtain QSI 
scores. Market shares are then calculated as the ratio between the scores of each individual CB 
itinerary and the sum of the scores of all itineraries in the same origin and destination market. 
This leads to our baseline scenario. The development scenario is obtained using the same 
procedure with two key changes: 1) removing the effect of the four self-connection coefficients 
in the Poisson and zero-generating models, 2) increase the price of self-connecting itineraries 
in 40 USD per transfer6. By removing the two self-connection coefficients from the Poisson 
equation, the difference in connection “quality” associated to self-connecting travel options, 
with respect to traditional flight transfers, is removed. We argue that this represents a scenario 
in which airports provide baggage and insurance services with self-connecting platforms. By 
removing the two additional self-connection coefficients from the zero-generating equation, 
the difference in “visibility” between self-connections and traditional connections is removed 
as well (e.g. by having online booking platforms that automatically show self-connecting 
options to the passenger and hence, finding them does not require an extra search effort). Our 
development scenario combines both effects (the quality and visibility gaps are closed). This 
will lead to a forecast of the amount of self-connection traffic in the event of a widespread 
development of platforms like the ones in Gatwick or Milano that make the self-connection 
experience more comparable to traditional connectivity.  
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
                                                 
6 This is intended to match the price for self-connectivity at Gatwick (GBP 27.50). Alternative prices we also used 
(from USD 20 to USD 50) without a significant impact on the results. 
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As seen in Table 8, the baseline scenario indicates that about 1.5% of air travel in European 
holiday markets is currently self-connecting (approximately 50,000 weekly connections). In 
the development scenario, self-connectivity is predicted to increase five-fold (approximately 
250,000 weekly connections), at the expense of both non-stop travel and traditional 
connectivity. Overall, the development scenario contemplates a 5% increase in the share of 
indirect air travel in European holiday markets. 
Table 8. Summary of baseline and development scenarios 
Baseline (weekly traffic)  Development (weekly traffic) 
Itinerary Bookings %  Itinerary Bookings % 
Non-stop 2,913,200 90.3%  Non-stop 2,779,473 86.1% 
Indirect Traditional 264,031 8.2%  Indirect Traditional 198,984 6.2% 
Self-Connecting 49,845 1.5%  Self-Connecting 248,619 7.7% 
Total 3,227,076    Total 3,227,076   
The predicted amounts of self-connecting traffic for the top-25 airports in the baseline scenario 
are presented in Table 9. In addition, we also include the actual (MIDT) and predicted amounts 
of total connectivity (traditional plus self-connectivity) in order to establish the degree of 
accuracy of our model. The average deviation from the actual connectivity for the selected 
airports is 15%. In spite of that, the airport rankings according to actual and predicted 
connectivity are highly consistent (Spearman’s rank correlation = 95.9%). The results for the 
top-25 airports in the development scenario are shown in Table 10.  
Given the current schedules in the European air transport network, the airports with the highest 
potential to benefit from implementing self-connection platforms in European holiday markets 
are Rome, Barcelona, Munich, Frankfurt, Athens, and Gatwick. The leading position of these 
airports arises as a result of good indirect connectivity, with respect to competing hubs or direct 
air travel, in origin and destination markets that are relatively dense with passenger traffic. 
Furthermore, these airports are characterized by their central location in relation to the 
European holiday traffic flows. This centrality can be understood in both a geographical sense 
(e.g. Rome, Athens) and in a topological sense (e.g. airports that serve as gateway between 
their countries and international holiday destinations). In the baseline scenario, it is clearly seen 
that airports dominated by of LCCs benefit from a higher amount of self-connecting potential 
(e.g. Barcelona, Gatwick). However, this is not a necessary requirement as interlining 
opportunities can also be present in airports with a diverse mix of traditional network airlines 
from different alliances. In the development scenario, LCC-dominated airports present the 
highest increases in self-connecting traffic. This reflects negatively on Frankfurt, whose lack 
of LCC traffic leads to traffic leakage to other hubs with expanded travel options, particularly 
in comparison with Rome Fiumicino or other hubs in central Europe (Appendix B provides 
information on the three markets where Frankfurt Airport is predicted to lose the largest amount 
of indirect traffic in the development scenario).  
Tables 9 and 10 also provide several airport-specific indicators that assess the complexity of 
the implementation of self-connecting platforms. First, we report the proportion of self-
connecting bookings that would involve an inter-terminal transfer as a proxy for the increased 
pressure on passenger mobility or airport baggage handling systems. The rates of inter-terminal 
transfer are significant for most airports with complex terminal layouts, ranging from 22% at 
Barcelona to 94% at Paris-CDG, respectively. Thus, they are an important factor to take into 
account while evaluating the feasibility and timescales of implementation since a large flow of 
inter-terminal passengers and luggage would need to be incorporated into the terminal 
operations. The variability across airports, however, suggests that the self-connecting fees 
charged to the passengers could be different depending on the size and complexity of the 
airport’s terminal layout, with the objective to reflect any differences in operating cost 
associated to the self-connection. This is a factor that airports without inter-terminal transfers, 
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like Palma de Mallorca, Athens, or Vienna could exploit to achieve a pricing advantage. On 
the other hand, airports and airlines could also decide to bring the busiest self-connection 
partners closer together in the terminal to minimize disruption to other passenger flows. 
From the airline perspective, there is a clear divide between LCC-dominated and other airports 
as the first category allows for a higher proportion of inline self-connectivity. This would allow 
for an initial implementation of these services that is not highly dependent on interline 
negotiations. For example, 53.4% of feeding passengers (arriving) and 47.1% of onward 
passengers (departing) could be served by Easyjet at Gatwick (Table 11). While Lufthansa 
would also dominate both feeding and onward self-connecting traffic at Frankfurt and Munich, 
it is always dependent on reaching agreements with other airlines. The same applies to the 
recently announced strategy of Ryanair to start offering connecting services at Barcelona 
Airport (CAPA, 2016), which, at least in what concerns to intra-European holiday markets, can 
greatly benefit from interlining. The complexity of these airline negotiations, however, will 
benefit from a reduction in the number of actors involved. We characterize that by calculating 
the HHI of the interline traffic flows: the higher the HHI the more concentrated is interline 
traffic among fewer airlines at a particular location. Our results show that airports like Vienna, 
Prague, or Copenhagen may benefit from a higher concentration in self-connecting frequencies, 
and thus simpler negotiations, in comparison with other airports. 
Table 9. Top-25 airports according to self-connectivity in baseline scenario 
Airport Code   Baseline (weekly traffic) 
Connections (MIDT) Connections (predicted) Self-Connections % of conn. Inline HHI 
Inter- 
terminal 
Rome Fiumicino  FCO 36,572 37,284 8,185 22.0% 2.8% 0.026 72.1% 
London Gatwick  LGW 4,049 4,385 2,605 59.4% 24.3% 0.083 46.4% 
Barcelona  BCN 11,864 16,667 2,379 14.3% 4.9% 0.043 22.2% 
Munich MUC 18,896 22,722 1,985 8.7% 0.0% 0.039 78.1% 
Athens ATH 12,622 16,058 1,833 11.4% 0.3% 0.043 0.0% 
Madrid Barajas  MAD 18,268 20,356 1,541 7.6% 10.5% 0.037 68.5% 
Frankfurt FRA 25,642 32,353 1,497 4.6% 0.0% 0.030 61.2% 
Paris Orly  ORY 4,622 5,034 1,284 25.5% 1.9% 0.038 51.8% 
Paris CDG CDG 10,333 8,838 1,103 12.5% 1.7% 0.025 93.9% 
Palma de Mallorca PMI 4,265 4,825 1,030 21.3% 5.3% 0.022 0.0% 
Nice NCE 855 1,395 963 69.1% 3.0% 0.075 41.1% 
Vienna VIE 9,048 11,716 957 8.2% 0.0% 0.189 0.0% 
Amsterdam AMS 8,594 10,373 949 9.2% 0.7% 0.047 0.0% 
Brussels  BRU 5,165 5,309 903 17.0% 0.7% 0.019 0.0% 
Geneva GVA 1,287 1,997 836 41.8% 24.9% 0.084 0.4% 
Copenhagen  CPH 4,785 4,731 800 16.9% 5.1% 0.086 84.0% 
Marseille Provence  MRS 1,301 1,013 784 77.4% 3.8% 0.062 85.1% 
Lisbon LIS 8,148 8,029 753 9.4% 1.7% 0.068 23.2% 
Milan Malpensa  MXP 654 1,383 751 54.3% 28.0% 0.072 33.0% 
Zurich  ZRH 9,483 11,457 681 5.9% 0.0% 0.036 0.0% 
Manchester MAN 1,463 708 650 91.8% 2.5% 0.029 69.6% 
Dusseldorf DUS 4,491 5,297 603 11.4% 0.0% 0.056 0.0% 
Prague Ruzyne PRG 1,037 1,211 553 45.7% 7.6% 0.108 37.5% 
London Heathrow  LHR 5,143 4,465 518 11.6% 0.0% 0.056 68.2% 
Lyon St-Exupery  LYS 1,867 2,633 502 19.1% 6.2% 0.042 75.4% 
 
Table 10. Top-25 airports according to self-connectivity in development scenario 
Airport Code Increase in 
connecting 
passengers 
(%) 
Development (weekly traffic) 
Connections 
Self-
Connections 
% of conn. Inline HHI 
Inter- 
terminal 
Rome Fiumicino  FCO 59.25% 59,374 37,515 63.2% 2.2% 0.031 69.9% 
Barcelona  BCN 39.03% 23,173 13,480 58.2% 3.8% 0.042 22.8% 
London Gatwick  LGW 185.13% 12,503 11,365 90.9% 23.7% 0.090 47.3% 
Munich MUC 17.75% 26,755 10,911 40.8% 0.1% 0.044 78.9% 
Frankfurt FRA -3.66% 31,168 8,384 26.9% 0.0% 0.029 65.2% 
Madrid Barajas  MAD 10.59% 22,510 8,242 36.6% 6.4% 0.031 68.1% 
Athens ATH 12.04% 17,992 7,746 43.1% 0.8% 0.047 0.0% 
Palma de Mallorca PMI 95.91% 9,452 6,354 67.2% 3.9% 0.020 0.0% 
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Paris CDG CDG 35.08% 11,938 6,348 53.2% 2.5% 0.030 93.8% 
Paris Orly  ORY 70.33% 8,575 5,494 64.1% 3.5% 0.034 54.2% 
Geneva GVA 198.82% 5,967 5,105 85.5% 23.7% 0.078 0.4% 
Vienna VIE 11.94% 13,115 4,932 37.6% 0.0% 0.124 0.0% 
Amsterdam AMS 12.85% 11,705 4,655 39.8% 0.8% 0.042 0.0% 
Brussels  BRU 49.72% 7,949 4,634 58.3% 0.8% 0.022 0.0% 
Zurich  ZRH 10.89% 12,705 4,350 34.2% 0.0% 0.038 0.0% 
Copenhagen  CPH 50.93% 7,140 4,128 57.8% 3.0% 0.136 83.3% 
Milan Malpensa  MXP 226.65% 4,518 4,034 89.3% 23.2% 0.053 33.8% 
Dusseldorf DUS 30.10% 6,891 3,626 52.6% 0.0% 0.065 0.0% 
Lisbon LIS 10.77% 8,894 3,490 39.2% 1.2% 0.073 25.7% 
Nice NCE 160.69% 3,635 3,294 90.6% 7.5% 0.046 41.1% 
Prague Ruzyne PRG 170.17% 3,273 2,839 86.7% 4.0% 0.073 42.4% 
Marseille Provence  MRS 173.59% 2,771 2,591 93.5% 3.7% 0.051 81.9% 
Manchester MAN 237.98% 2,393 2,346 98.0% 5.1% 0.018 58.4% 
London Heathrow  LHR 14.97% 5,134 2,324 45.3% 0.0% 0.049 77.9% 
Lyon St-Exupery  LYS 54.08% 4,058 2,225 54.8% 7.9% 0.032 77.6% 
 
Table 11. Top-3 largest feed and onward airlines at selected airports (development scenario) 
Hub Rome Fiumicino Barcelona Munich London Gatwick Frankfurt 
Feed Easyjet 21.71% Vueling 28.18% Lufthansa 35.51% Easyjet 53.40% Lufthansa 43.80% 
 Alitalia 17.12% Ryanair 19.61% Air Berlin 24.74% Norwegian 20.11% British Awys 6.76% 
  Vueling 8.13% Easyjet 10.61% British Awys 3.51% British Awys 9.61% Air Berlin 5.72% 
Onward Alitalia 48.72% Vueling 43.40% Lufthansa 29.43% Easyjet 47.10% Lufthansa 30.49% 
 Vueling 10.54% Ryanair 23.27% Air Berlin 16.63% British Awys 16.84% Condor 12.59% 
  Ryanair 9.40% Air Europa 11.45% Vueling 9.16% Monarch 10.27% Air Berlin 8.24% 
 
Tables 12 and 13 rank the airlines’ potential for self-connections in the baseline and 
development scenarios, respectively. Unsurprisingly, results indicate that LCCs like Easyjet, 
Ryanair, and Vueling present the highest potential to benefit from self-connectivity in intra-
European holiday markets7, having a relatively balanced participation as feeding and onward 
carriers. However, there is also room for traditional carriers, with the primary role determined 
by the geographic location of the airline’s main base. While Air France, British Airways, SAS, 
and Lufthansa can play a primarily feeding role, Alitalia should be able to leverage its prime 
position at Rome to serve onward traffic to destinations in the Mediterranean. Similarly to the 
airport case, the development of self-connectivity seems to affect Lufthansa negatively due to 
the competition for other airlines and hubs (Appendix B). Finally, Table 14 provides an overall 
view of potential airline self-connecting relationships in the development scenario. It is 
interesting to find examples of intra-LCC, inter-LCC, traditional-LCC and traditional-
traditional interlining flows among the busiest ones in the holiday markets. Results show that 
Ryanair would have the largest amount of inline self-connections (34.2%) following by Easyjet 
(20.4%). Inter-LCC collaboration can also be beneficial: Easyjet could potentially serve the 
largest proportion of onward seats for the passengers fed by Norwegian. The possibility of 
collaboration between traditional carriers and LCCs is illustrated by the reciprocal traffic flows 
between Alitalia and Vueling or between Lufthansa and Air Berlin. Finally, self-connecting 
opportunities can also be offered across airline alliances, e.g. British Airways (feeding) and 
Alitalia (onward), though, in this case, the roles are not reciprocal. The diversity in airline 
partnerships suggested by this exploratory analysis suggests that there is indeed an interesting 
potential for this type of traffic (hidden in the complexity of airline schedules), as the 
passengers’ desire to cut airfares makes then step beyond the boundaries of traditional 
connectivity to create links between airlines that have never collaborated before. 
Table 12. Top-25 airlines according to self-connectivity in baseline scenario 
Airline Code 
Baseline (weekly traffic) 
Connecting Self-connect % conn. Feed (%) Onward (%) 
Easyjet U2 11,551 11,551 100% 60.9% 39.1% 
Ryanair FR 10,376 10,376 100% 41.6% 58.4% 
Alitalia AZ 64,266 6,871 11% 25.0% 75.0% 
                                                 
7 Note that Vueling’s connecting services at Barcelona are not considered self-connections. 
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Vueling VY 34,513 6,493 19% 35.3% 64.7% 
Lufthansa LH 88,920 3,362 4% 63.8% 36.2% 
Air France AF 27,824 3,105 11% 73.4% 26.6% 
Air Berlin AB 27,808 2,942 11% 53.7% 46.3% 
Norwegian DY 13,528 2,811 21% 67.1% 32.9% 
Aegean A3 35,091 2,589 7% 33.8% 66.2% 
British Awys BA 14,343 2,423 17% 75.9% 24.1% 
TAP Portugal TP 21,533 2,366 11% 34.9% 65.1% 
germanwings 4U 7,562 1,883 25% 73.8% 26.2% 
SAS SK 18,484 1,873 10% 90.3% 9.7% 
Air Europa UX 11,357 1,610 14% 45.7% 54.3% 
Iberia IB 33,203 1,541 5% 50.7% 49.3% 
Meridian IG 1,725 1,504 87% 38.3% 61.7% 
KLM KL 17,052 1,357 8% 84.8% 15.2% 
Royal Air Maroc AT 7,259 1,299 18% 0.9% 99.1% 
Aer Lingus EI 3,022 1,211 40% 95.6% 4.4% 
Air Malta KM 1,449 1,054 73% 29.9% 70.1% 
Swiss/Crossair LX 19,208 1,012 5% 67.9% 32.1% 
Condor Flugdienst DE 1,547 937 61% 26.5% 73.5% 
Austrian Airlines OS 15,553 923 6% 72.5% 27.5% 
NIKI HG 5,748 916 16% 38.1% 61.9% 
El Al Israel LY 1,111 909 82% 5.0% 95.0% 
 
Table 13. Top-25 airlines according to self-connectivity in development scenario 
Airline Code 
Increase in  
connecting 
passengers (%) 
Development (weekly traffic) 
Connecting Self-connect % conn. Feed (%) Onward (%) 
Easyjet U2 447.7% 63,258 63,258 100.0% 63.8% 36.2% 
Ryanair FR 355.8% 47,288 47,288 100.0% 44.0% 56.0% 
Vueling VY 66.8% 57,557 38,882 67.6% 33.7% 66.3% 
Alitalia AZ 20.2% 77,251 34,005 44.0% 23.9% 76.1% 
Lufthansa LH -4.7% 84,730 20,407 24.1% 68.0% 32.0% 
Air Berlin AB 38.5% 38,510 20,019 52.0% 54.6% 45.4% 
Air France AF 27.3% 35,406 16,027 45.3% 72.5% 27.5% 
Norwegian DY 74.4% 23,592 15,388 65.2% 62.3% 37.7% 
Aegean A3 4.0% 36,500 12,910 35.4% 29.5% 70.5% 
British Awys BA 47.6% 21,166 12,758 60.3% 77.9% 22.1% 
germanwings 4U 122.5% 16,822 12,515 74.4% 73.3% 26.7% 
TAP Portugal TP 16.9% 25,167 10,791 42.9% 28.3% 71.7% 
SAS SK 24.2% 22,952 10,508 45.8% 89.6% 10.4% 
Iberia IB 2.1% 33,901 9,648 28.5% 48.3% 51.7% 
Air Europa UX 46.0% 16,586 9,454 57.0% 45.8% 54.2% 
Meridian IG 352.2% 7,803 7,626 97.7% 33.4% 66.6% 
KLM KL 13.3% 19,312 7,258 37.6% 87.0% 13.0% 
Swiss/Crossair LX 10.4% 21,201 6,701 31.6% 68.6% 31.4% 
El Al Israel LY 463.0% 6,256 6,116 97.7% 3.0% 97.0% 
Royal Air Maroc AT 41.7% 10,288 5,606 54.5% 1.1% 98.9% 
Condor Flugdienst DE 247.2% 5,372 5,022 93.5% 34.4% 65.6% 
Austrian Airlines OS 5.0% 16,326 4,964 30.4% 72.2% 27.8% 
Air Malta KM 240.2% 4,931 4,673 94.8% 16.6% 83.4% 
Brussels Airlines SN 30.8% 9,576 4,567 47.7% 81.2% 18.8% 
NIKI HG 38.3% 7,949 4,557 57.3% 46.0% 54.0% 
 
Table 14. Top-10 onward airlines for the busiest feeding airlines (development scenario): all markets 
Feeding Easyjet Lufthansa Ryanair Vueling Alitalia 
O
n
w
a
rd
  
(%
 s
el
f-
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n
n
e
ct
io
n
s)
 
Easyjet 20.4% Air Berlin 20.9% Ryanair 34.2% Alitalia 19.5% Vueling 20.0% 
Alitalia 15.0% Vueling 11.3% Vueling 13.4% Ryanair 16.6% Ryanair 15.9% 
Vueling 8.0% Alitalia 11.1% Alitalia 11.8% Vueling 9.7% Easyjet 10.4% 
Ryanair 6.4% Condor  10.7% Aegean  4.0% Air Europa 8.2% Meridiana 9.7% 
TAP Portugal 4.8% TUIfly 7.7% TAP Portugal 4.0% Iberia 6.5% Aegean  8.1% 
Aegean  4.4% El Al Israel 4.3% Easyjet 4.0% TAP Portugal 6.0% Livingston Air 4.6% 
Air France 3.0% Ryanair 4.3% Iberia 3.9% Binter Canarias 4.1% El Al Israel 4.4% 
Royal Air Maroc 2.8% Air Malta 3.9% Air Europa 3.8% Easyjet 4.0% Egyptair 4.2% 
British Awys 2.8% Easyjet 3.0% Binter Canarias 3.1% Aegean  2.6% TAP Portugal 3.7% 
El Al Israel 2.4% Royal Air Maroc 2.5% Meridiana 1.4% El Al Israel 2.6% Air Malta 3.0% 
Feeding Air France Air Berlin Norwegian Aegean British Awys 
O
n
w
a
rd
  
(%
 
se
lf
-
c
o
n
n
e
c
ti
o
n
s
) 
Easyjet 15.0% Lufthansa   19.6% Easyjet 16.6% Alitalia 22.3% Alitalia 13.9% 
Vueling 9.3% Vueling 11.1% Vueling 11.0% Ryanair 19.0% Easyjet 12.3% 
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Royal Air Maroc 8.7% Germanwings 9.6% Alitalia 10.2% Easyjet 12.5% Lufthansa   5.9% 
Air Algerie 7.7% Aegean  6.4% SAS   8.4% Cyprus Awys 11.0% Ryanair 5.7% 
Aegean  7.3% Condor  6.2% Ryanair 6.1% Vueling 5.4% Aegean  5.5% 
Ryanair 6.3% Ryanair 6.0% Norwegian  4.3% Middle East  5.0% TAP Portugal 4.3% 
Air Corsica 6.1% Alitalia 4.8% British Awys 4.2% El Al Israel 4.7% Vueling 3.7% 
El Al Israel 4.2% TUIfly 4.2% Aegean  3.8% Royal Jordanian 2.6% Air France 3.6% 
Aigle Azur 3.9% Austrian  3.2% SmartWings 3.3% Air France 2.2% Egyptair 3.6% 
TAP Portugal 3.7% Air Europa 2.9% Monarch  3.0% Sky Express 1.9% Air Malta 3.3% 
 
5. SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper analyses the potential for self-connectivity in European holiday air transport 
markets using MIDT data from June 2014. Our empirical strategy is based on a QSI model 
calibrated with a zero-inflated Poisson regression. Our baseline scenario estimates that about 
1.5% of passenger bookings in European holiday markets are currently self-connecting. A 
development scenario suggests that this proportion could increase by approximately five times 
if self-connecting travel achieves the same quality than traditional connections and it becomes 
visible in booking platforms. The airports with the highest potential to benefit from self-
connection platforms in European holiday markets are Rome, Barcelona, Munich, Frankfurt, 
Athens, and Gatwick. These airports are characterized by their central location in relation to 
the European holiday traffic flows. In general, LCC-dominated airports benefit from larger 
increases in self-connecting traffic in the development scenario.  
We also investigate potential barriers to the implementation of self-connecting platforms. First, 
the rates of inter-terminal self-connections are significant for most airports and hence, they are 
an important factor to take into account while evaluating the feasibility and timescales of 
implementation due to the increased pressure on baggage handling systems. From the airline 
perspective, LCC-dominated airports present a higher share of inline self-connectivity. This 
would allow for an initial implementation of these services that is not dependent on interline 
negotiations. Results also indicate that LCCs like Easyjet, Ryanair, and Vueling have the 
highest potential to benefit from self-connectivity in intra-European holiday markets, with 
Ryanair having the largest proportion of inline connections. However, there is also room for 
traditional carriers to partner with LCCs or other traditional carriers. While Air France, British 
Airways, and Lufthansa can play a primarily feeding role, Alitalia can leverage its prime 
position at Rome to serve onward traffic to destinations in the Mediterranean.   
This research, however, has a few limitations. First, the estimation process can benefit for 
higher-quality price information. This would allow for a better characterization on the impact 
of reduced fares on passenger demand and also to obtain an estimation on potential cost savings 
for passengers and revenue implications for airlines. Any generation of new demand as a result 
of the availability of new frequencies in previously unserved markets is not modelled either. 
Finally, further research may want to consider expanding this approach to other markets. The 
recent development of low-cost long-haul routes (e.g. Norwegian routes to North America) 
may create opportunities for LCCs to tap into intercontinental markets and expand their scope 
of competition against traditional network carriers. 
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APPENDIX A. Tourist airports in mainland Spain, Italy, and France 
Country Code Airport   Country Code Airport 
France MRS Marseille Provence  Italy BDS Brindisi 
France NCE Nice  Italy REG Reggio Di Calabria 
France MPL Montpellier Mediterranee  Italy RMI Rimini 
France PGF Perpignan  Italy TSF Venice Treviso/Sant'angelo 
France TLN Toulon/Hyeres  Italy VIF Vieste 
France BZR Beziers  Spain AGP Malaga 
Italy BRI Bari  Spain ALC Alicante 
Italy FCO Rome Fiumicino  Spain BCN Barcelona 
Italy NAP Naples Capodichino  Spain IBZ Ibiza 
Italy PSA Pisa  Spain PMI Palma de Mallorca 
Italy SUF Lamezia Terme  Spain VLC Valencia (ES) 
Italy TRS Trieste  Spain GRO Girona 
Italy VCE Venice Marco Polo  Spain LEI Almeria 
Italy CIA Rome Ciampino  Spain MJV Murcia 
Italy GOA Genoa  Spain MAH Menorca 
Italy PSR Pescara  Spain REU Reus 
Italy AOI Ancona         
 
APPENDIX B. Passenger leakage out of Frankfurt airport in selected routes 
Market 
Hub 
Market Share 
Origin Destination Baseline Development 
Copenhagen Malta Frankfurt 62.1% 25.0% 
    Rome Fiumicino 3.6% 12.3% 
Helsinki Malta Frankfurt 43.4% 17.2% 
    Rome Fiumicino 6.3% 19.1% 
Stutgart Malta Frankfurt 71.8% 34.8% 
  Vienna 15.1% 23.9% 
    Zurich 4.1% 20.7% 
 
